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STATE v. SORENSON'
THE ADEQUACY OF THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTIONS IN
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES:
FIVE-PART TEST PUTS AN END TO THE CRITICISM
INTRODUCTION
Child sexual abuse. Nobody likes to think about it. Most people would like
to think it does not happen -- but it does -- with shocking frequency. Although
statistical estimates vary, all studies indicate the severity of the problem. One study
has indicated that possibly "160,000 women per million in this country may have
been incestuously abused before the age of eighteen, and 45,000 per million may
have been victimized by their fathers.' '2 Some studies have projected that "a child
is molested every two minutes in the United States; the majority of the victims are
between the ages of eight and [thirteen].' 3 Long-term effects of incestuous relation-
ships include, "[piromiscuity, inability to assume a wife/mother role, alcoholism,
drug abuse, prostitution, sexual dysfunctioning, delinquency, depression, and sui-
cide .... ,'
In State v. Sorenson,5 a seven-year-old girl's father and uncle had sexual
intercourse with her.6 The court allowed a social worker to testify as to what the girl
had told her. 7 Finally, a court has set forth a detailed test for use in determining the
admissibility of hearsay evidence in child sexual abuse cases. This casenote will
analyze the court's five-part test, and discuss how it was applied in Sorenson. The
casenote will then compare the Sorenson test (used in conjunction with the residual
exceptions) to statutes providing for specific hearsay exceptions in child sexual
abuse cases.
FACTS
In Sorenson, a social worker interviewed L.S., a seven-year-old girl, regarding
possible sexual abuse.8 During the interview, L.S. used "anatomically-correct dolls,
and crude, explicit language" to reveal that her father, Ronald Sorenson, and her
1 143 Wis.2d 226, 421 N.W.2d 77 (1988).
2 D.E.H. RUSSELL, THE SECRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES OF GIRLS AND WOMEN 10 (1986).
3 Guidelines for the Fair Treatment of Child Witnessess in Cases Where Child Abuse is Alleged, American
Bar Association (1985) (citing McCall, The Cruelest Crime: Sexual Abuse of Children, LIFE, Dec. 1984, at
35).
B. VANDER MEY & R. NEFF, INCEST AS CHILD ABUSE: RESEARCH AND APPLICATIONS 69 (footnotes omitted).
143 Wis. 2d 226. 421 N.W.2d 77 (1988).
Id. at 233, 421 N.W.2d at 79.
7 Id. at 232, 421 N.W.2d at 80.
Id. at 233, 421 N.W.2d at 79.
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uncle, Donald Sorenson, had sexually assaulted her.' The social worker reported her
findings to a deputy sheriff."'
At Ronald Sorenson's preliminary hearing, L.S. admitted that her uncle
assaulted her, but would not answer questions regarding her father's assault on her."
However, L.S. admitted that she had told the social worker a "secret about daddy."' 2
Pursuant to section 908.04(1)(b), Stats., 3the trial court declared L.S. an unavailable
witness."
The trial court allowed the social worker to testify regarding L.S.'s state-
ments.' I- The social worker testified that L.S. reported that both her uncle and her
father had sexually abused her, that her father had abused her when her mother was
at the doctor's office, and that "she had to wipe herself off after her father assaulted
her and that her father told her to tell her mother that she had 'wet her pants.'" " The
social worker further testified that L.S. distinguished between her uncle's assault,
which occurred on the living room couch, and her father's assault which took place
in the bathroom. 7 The social worker also testified that L.S. informed the social
worker that she did not testify against her father because "she [L.S.] was not going
to have Daddy go to jail, Mommy would be mad at her, she wouldn't get to go back
home."" The social worker also testified that between the time L.S. was removed
from her home and her father's arrest,"'L.S.'s father had contacted the social worker
to see whether L.S. had talked about her father at all. 2"
During the trial, the examining physician testified that L.S. had had sexual
intercourse repeatedly over a period of time,2' that L.S. had voluntarily reported that
Id.
Id. Ronald Sorenson was arrested three days after Donald Sorenson and was charged with one count of
first degree sexual assault WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(1 )(d) (West 1975). Id. at 233-34, 421 N.W.2d at 80.
Section 940.225(1 )(d) provides in pertinent part as follows: Sexvualassault. (I) First Degree Sexual Assault.
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class B felony: .. .(d) Has sexual contact or sexual
intercourse with a person [twelve] years of age or younger.
" Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 234, 421 N.W.2d at 80.
12 Id.
" Section 908.04(1 )(b) provides in pertinent part as follows: "Hearsay e,(epltions; declarant unavailable;
definition of unavailability. (1) 'Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant: ..
. (b) Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite an order of the judge
to do so." See also corresponding FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(2).
"
4Sorenson, 143 Wis.2d at 234,421 N.W.2d at 80. The trial court did not order L.S. to testify since "it would
have been 'fruitless' and 'inappropriate' because of her young age." Id.
15 Id.
"I d. at 235, 421 N.W.2d at 80.
17 Id.
IX ld. at 235-36, 421 N.W.2d at 80.
' L.S.'s father, Ronald Sorenson, was informed that L.S. was being placed in a foster home due to suspected
sexual abuse by Donald Sorenson. Id. at 233,421 N.W.2d at 79-80. Three days later, Ronald Sorenson was
also arrested. See supwa note 10.
21 Id. at 236, 421 N.W.2d at 80.
21 Id. at 237, 421 N.W.2d at 81. According to the examining physician, the last act occurred approximately
between four to seven days before L.S.'s initial interview with the social worker. Id.
[Vol. 22:3
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her father and uncle sexually abused her,2 2 and that L.S. "spontaneously drew a
picture" depicting a man, whom she identified as "daddy," with an "enormously
distorted," "erect" penis.
2 3
At the trial, L.S. used anatomically-correct dolls to describe her father's acts
of sexual intercourse with her.24 Three videos of L.S.'s testimony were shown to the
jury. 25 The first video was taken at Ronald Sorenson's preliminary hearing. 26 The
second video was taken for use at ajuvenile placement hearing.2 7The third video was
taken during Donald Sorenson's preliminary hearing.
21
At the trial, Ronald Sorenson testified that he did not sexually abuse L.S., but
that he believed her uncle did assault L.S. over a period of time. 9 He also testified
that he had not been alone with L.S. for any long period of time four to seven days
before her interview with the social worker."
Based primarily on the social worker's testimony," the trial court found
probable cause to bind Ronald Sorenson over for trial.3 2 Before trial, Ronald
Sorenson moved to dismiss, claiming that the trial court had based its determination
of probable cause on inadmissible hearsay; 33 therefore, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction. 34 Ronald Sorenson also moved to enjoin the testimony of both the
examining physician and the social worker, again claiming inadmissible hearsay.
3 1
The trial court denied Ronald Sorenson's motions.36
The trial court admitted the hearsay testimony under an "expanded" interpre-
22 Id. The physician also testified that L.S. distinguished between the different locations in her house (see
supra text accompanying note 17) where her father and uncle had assaulted her. Id. A clinical psychologist
also examined L.S. and testified that L.S. admitted she was assaulted by Ronald as well as Donald Sorenson,
and described L.S. as "deficient in being able to 'sequence acts and times," "distractible," "verbal ability
impaired," and "very anxious." Id. at 238, 421 N.W.2d at 81-82.




" Id. In this video. L.S. stated that she was sexually assaulted by "Daddy" and that she did not tell her mother
because "it was a secret." Id.
2- Id. In this video, L.S. answered "yes" when she was asked if the defense attorney assaulted her, then
nodded "no" when asked the same question again, and then nodded 'yes" to answer that she was confused.
Id. at 238, 421 N.W.2d at 81.
" Id. at 239, 421 N.W.2d at 82.
Id. This is when the last act of sexual abuse occurred. See supra note 21. L.S.'s mother also testified that
"she had told L.S. not to say anything about her father at that [preliminary] hearing," and that both Donald
and Ronald Sorenson had had opportunities to be alone with L.S. Id. at 238, 421 N.W.2d at 81.
3' Id. at 236, 421 N.W.2d at 81.
32 
Id.
( 1 d. "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing.
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. Evto. 801 (c).
I Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 236, 421 N.W.2d at 81.
35 Id. at 236-37, 421 N.W.2d at 8 1.
1 Id. at 237, 421 N.W.2d at 81.
NOTES
3
Renis: The Adequacy of the Residual Exceptions in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1989
AKRON LAW REVIEW
tation of the hearsay exception for former testimony.37 The jury convicted Ronald
Sorenson of first degree sexual assault."
The court of appeals reversed the judgment, holding that no probable cause
existed because the testimony given at the preliminary hearing was inadmissible;
accordingly, Ronald Sorenson was improperly bound over for trial.39 L.S. appealed
to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, which reinstated the trial court's conviction.4"
The Wisconsin Supreme Court began its analysis by discussing the admissi-
bility of the hearsay statements under the traditional hearsay exceptions.4 First, the
court determined that the former testimony exception was inapplicable because the
testimony was not given "at a prior judicial hearing or proceeding, or in a formal
deposition," and opposing counsel did not have the opportunity "to develop
testimony on cross-examination" as required by section 908.045(1), Stats.42 The
court then stated that it would not address the exception for statements against the
declarant's interest because the record was not fully developed as to whether, at the
time of the social worker's interview with L.S., L.S. was aware of the impact of her
statements regarding her father.43
Instead, the court analyzed the residual hearsay exception 44 and its application
31 Id. at 240. 421 N.W.2d at 82. Section 908.045(l) provides in pertinent part as follows: "Hearsay
exceptions, declarant unavailabhle. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness: (I ) Fornier Testimonv. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same
or a different proceeding. or in a deposition ... at the instance of or against a party with an opportunity to
develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination .... - See also corresponding FuD. R. Ev1D.
804(b)( 1).
" Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 239, 421 N.W.2d at 82.
3" Id. at 239-40.421 N.W.2d at 82.
41 Id. at 232-33, 421 N.W.2d at 79.
41 Id. at 240, 421 N.W.2d at 82-83. The other issues addressed by the court including the sufficiency of the
complaint, the State's failure to prove a single date of offense, and the defendant's post-Miranda silence will
not be discussed in this casenote.
421d. at 240-41, 421 N.W.2d at 82-83; see supra note 37.
4. Id. at 241, 421 N.W.2d at 83. The court of appeals held that this exception was inapplicable. State v.
Sorenson, 135 Wis. 2d 468, 472, 400 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Wis. App. 1986). Section 908.045(4) provides in
pertinent part as follows: Hearsayv exceptions: declarant unavailable. The following are not excluded by
the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: . .. (4) Statement Against Interest. A statement
which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest....
or to make the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, that a reasonable person in the declarant's
position would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true ...... See also
corresponding FED. R. Evio. 804(b)(3).
4 Section 908.045(6) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Hearsay esvceptions; declarant unavailahle. The following arc not excluded by the hearsay
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: ... (6) Other Exceptions. A statement not
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable circum-
stances guarantees of trustworthiness. Sec. 908.03(24) is similarly worded and applies when
the declarant is available as a witness. The two federal residual, or "catch-all," exceptions
now provide in pertinent part as follows: A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact: (B) the
[Vol. 22:3
4
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to child sexual abuse cases. The court noted that the Wisconsin Judicial Council
Committee Note45 specifically lists child sexual abuse cases as falling within the
residual hearsay exception domain. 6 The court recognized that children are often
unable or unwilling to express themselves in court. 7 Therefore, a "compelling need
for admission of hearsay" is created because the perpetrator and the victim are
usually the only witnesses to the crime.4" The court held that if a state legislature has
not provided the courts with a specific hearsay exception for child sexual abuse
cases, "use of the residual exception is an appropriate method to admit these
statements if they are otherwise proven sufficiently trustworthy."
49
The Soi-enson court first recognized the Bertrang v. State5" factors for
assessing guarantees of trustworthiness.' The Sorenson court then followed the
same path as Bertirang, detailing a five-factor test for use in assessing admissibility
of a child abuse victim's statements under the residual exception:
First, the attributes of the child making the statement should be
examined, including age, ability to communicate verbally, to compre-
hend the statements or questions of others, to know the difference
between truth and falsehood, and any fear of punishment, retribution or
other personal interest, such as close familial relationship with the
defendant, expressed by the child which might affect the child's method
of articulation or motivation to tell the truth.
Second, the court should examine the person to whom the state-
ment was made, focusing on the person's relationship to the child,
whether that relationship might have an impact upon the statement's
trustworthiness, and any motivation of the recipient of the statement to
fabricate or distort its contents.
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence ....
FEn. R. Evun. 803(24) and 804(b)(5).
45 59 Wis. 2d R301 (1974).
41 Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 243, 421 N.W.2d at 83.
47 Id. at 243, 421 N.W.2d at 83-84.
41 Id. at 243, 421 N.W.2d at 84.
49 Id.
" Wis. 2d 702, 184 N.W.2d 867 (1971) (defendant sexually assaulted his nine-year-old stepdaughter in his
home while his wife was in the hospital, having given birth to a child the day before).
SI Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 244,421 N.W.2d at 84; The Bertrang factors are: "the age of the child, the nature
of the assault, physical evidence of such assault, relationship of the child to the defendant, contemporaneity
and spontaneity of the assertions in relation to the alleged assault, reliability of the assertions themselves, and
the reliability of the testifying witness." Id. (quoting Bertrang, 50 Wis. 2d at 708, 184 N.W.2d at 870).
Winter, 19891 NOTES
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Third, the court should review the circumstances under which the
statement was made, including relation to the time of the alleged assault,
the availability of a person in whom the child might confide, and other
contextual factors which might enhance or detract from the statement's
trustworthiness.
Fourth, the content of the statement itself should be examined,
particularly noting any sign of deceit or falsity and whether the state-
ment reveals a knowledge of matters not ordinarily attributable to a
child of similar age.
Finally, other corroborating evidence, such as physical evidence
of assault, statements made to others, and opportunity or motive of the
defendant, should be examined for consistency with the assertions made
in the statement.
The weight accorded to each factor may vary given the circum-
stances unique to each case. It is intended, however, that no single factor
be dispositive of a statement's trustworthiness. Instead, the court must
evaluate the force and totality of all these factors to determine if the
statement possesses the requisite "circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness" required by section 908.045(6), Stats. 52
Applying this five-part test to the Sorenson facts, the court concluded that L.S.'s
statements to the social worker were admissible. 53
In analyzing the first factor, the court noted that L.S. had the mental and
emotional capacity of a four-year-old and concluded that "a child at such a young
age is unlikely to review an incident of sexual assault and calculate the effect of a
statement about it." 54 The court noted that L.S.'s belief that the sexual assaults were
a "secret", her fear of being taken away from her family and home, and her fear of
her mother's anger were "strong influences which might have otherwise impeded
free and immediate communication." ,55 The court also considered the intimidating
effects of the courtroom on a young child, and gave less weight to her "confusion
and unresponsiveness." 56 Finally, the court noted that there was no evidence that
L.S. had fabricated any part of her statements. 57
.,_ Id. at 245-46, 421 N.W.2d at 84-85.
53 Id. at 250, 421 N.W.2d at 86.
14 Id. at 246,421 N.W.2d at 85 (citing State v. Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d 414,422,329 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Ct. App.
1982); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1979)).
51 Id. at 247, 421 N.W.2d at 85 (citing Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two
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The court then analyzed the second factor, giving weight to the social worker's
experience in handling child sexual abuse cases.5" The court noted that the social
worker had no motive to fabricate the statements because the uncle's assault on L.S.
was enough to get a court order removing L.S. from her home.59 "[T]he social
worker refrained from even mentioning her father until L.S. raised the matter
herself."6
Regarding the third factor, the court stated: "[T]he fact that the assertions
[concerning sexual assault] are not made within a few minutes or even hours of the
alleged assault is not controlling, nor is the fact that they are not volunteered but made
in response to questions."'"
Proceeding to the fourth factor, the court examined the content of L.S.'s
statements. 62 It noted her descriptions of the assaults, her familiarity with sexual
organs and crude terminology, her knowledge of sexual intercourse, and her
differentiation between her uncle's acts on the living room couch and her father's
acts in the bathroom.6 - In the court's view, these statements indicated knowledge not
normally possessed by a seven-year-old child.64
Finally, as to other corroborating evidence, the court noted the physical
evidence of assault 65 and the fact that because L.S. and her father lived in the same
house, he had the opportunity to be alone with her.66
BACKGROUND
Child Sexual Abuse and Its Inherent Evidentiary Problems
One of the problems with child sexual abuse cases is that they are difficult to
58 Id.
59 Id. at 247-48, 421 N.W.2d at 85.
' Id.at 248, 421 N.W.2d at 85.
6 Id. at 248, 421 N.W.2d at 86 (quoting Bertrang, 50 Wis. 2d at 707, 184 N.W.2d at 870).
62 Id.at 249. 421 N.W.2d at 86.
63 Id.
'A Id.
11 Id. at 250, 421 N.W.2d at 86. The court permitted the physician's testimony at trial under § 908.03(4). Id.
at 252, 421 N.W.2d at 87. Section 908.03(4) provides in pertinent part as follows: "Hearsay exceptions
availability of declarant immaterial. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness: (4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." See also corresponding FED. R.EvIo. 803(4). The
court adhered to State v. Nelson, 138 Wis. 2d 418, 432, 406 N.W.2d 385, 391 (1987), noting that young
children understand that doctors and psychologists use statements made to them "to ease the child's physical
and emotional or psychological pain." Sorenson, 143 Wis.2d at 252, 421 N.W.2d at 87.
Id. at 250, 421 N.W.2d at 86.
NOTES
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prosecute.6 1 Usually the perpetrator and the child are the only witnesses to the
crime.6" The perpetrator is frequently the child's relative or close friend, having
ample opportunity to be alone with the child.69 Corroborative physical evidence may
be non-existent.70 Most crimes are non-violent; children often "do not resist their
attackers and succumb easily." 7 Children's out-of-court reports of sexual abuse
may be more reliable than testimony given in court7 2 due to a child's inability to
accurately recall facts and details, the remoteness in time between the offense and
the trial, the intimidating effects of the courtroom, and the coercive pressures on a
child to "change her story" before trial "[when] the perpetrator is a relative or close
family friend." 7 3
Children rarely make false reports of sexual abuse.74 It is more common for
children to make false denials or retract their statements than to make false
accusations.75 "Of the few reported false accusations, the child is usually coaxed to
lie by an adult and readily admits the lie upon direct questioning:"
7 6
A child may retract the report out of fear, guilt, shame, or self-blame. In
cases of incest, even more pressures on the child to retract the report
exist. If the child is removed from the home for protection, the child may
feel punished and lonely. If the child is kept in the home and the offender
is removed, the child may feel responsible and guilty for causing the
offender to be taken away. The child may also have to deal with the
mixed feelings of other family members. Many children fear that
"7 Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions for a Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 6
(1984).
" Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1745, 1750 (1983).
" Id. (citing Nick, 604 F.2d at 1201 (babysitter); State v. Ritchey, 107 Ariz. 552, 553-54,490 P.2d 558,559-
60 (1971) (family friend); Oldham v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 644, 646, 322 S.W.2d 616, 618 (1959)
(neighbor)).
711 State v. John Doe, 105 Wash. 2d 889,897,719 P.2d 554,558 (1986) (Utter, J., concurring) (citing Berliner,
The Child Witness: The Progress and Emerging Limitations, 40 U. OF MIAMI L. REV. 167, 171 (1985);
Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of SexualAssault, 40:2 J. Soc. ISSUES 125, 127 (1984)).
7' Note, supra note 68, at 1750. However, the fact that many crimes are non-violent does not mean the child
does not experience a great deal of pain. See e.g.. State v. Hunt, 48 Wash. App. 840, 841,741 P.2d 566, 567,
review denied, 109 Wash.2d 1014 (1987) ("[The child] cried while sitting on the toilet for an unusually long
time."); State v. Robinson, 44 Wash. App. 611,614,722 P.2d 1379, 1382, review denied, 107 Wash.2d 1009
(1986) ("hurt very much when she went to the bathroom.").
12 Skoler, supra note 67, at 38 (citing Melton, ProceduralReforms to Piotect Child Victim/Witnesses in Sev
Ofjnse Proceedings, Child Sexual Abuse and The Law, National Legal Resource Center forChild Advocacy
& Protection, American Bar Association (J. Bulkley 4th ed. 1983)).
11 Note, Minnesota's Hearsay Exception for Child Victims of Sexual Abuse, II WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 799,
806-07 (1985) (footnote omitted); See also, Hunt, 48 Wash. App. at 844,741 P.2d at 569 & n.3 ("In cases
of child sexual abuse, there may often be a substantial delay between the alleged crime and the child's
statement and another substantial delay between the statement and the time of trial").
71 Skoler, supra note 67, at 44-45 (citing Goodwin, Sahd & Rada, Incest Hoax: False Accusations, False
Denials, 6 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 269 (1978)).
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participation in the process of legal intervention, could cause the
offender to be sent to prison. In cases of incest, the child victim may
have mixed feelings toward the offender. By making the report, most




In the past, the excited utterance (res gestae) exception has been applied to
child abuse cases.78 The excited utterance exception focuses on "contemporaneity"
and "spontaneity". 79 However, this exception has proven inadequate because the
courts are forced to expand the time interval,80causing the hearsay statements to lose
their "spontaneity" as required by the exception. "Either the court is bound by the
inherent limitations of the excited utterance exception, which does not and.cannot
fit even the typical report of abuse, or the court is forced to liberalize the exception
until it has lost its original meaning.'' 8'
The inadequacy of the traditional exception has produced two primary
methods for handling child sexual abuse cases: (1) creating a separate hearsay
exception altogether specifically for child sexual abuse cases, or (2) liberally using
the residual exceptions as done in Sorenson. 2
ANALYSIS
Many commentators feel that child sexual abuse cases should not fall under the
residual exceptions; instead, a new exception should be created specifically for this
type of case.83 These commentators believe that the residual exceptions are inade-
quate because "judges, without guidance and with varying appreciation of the
problem of child sexual abuse, will decide these issues on a case by case basis." 84
7 Id. at 41-42.
7 See e.g. State v. Simmons, 52 N.J. 538, 540-42, 247 A.2d 313, 314-15, (1968), cert. denied. 395 U.S. 924
(1969). The defendant attacked his sister, a sixteen-year-old deaf-mute with a mental age under seven years.
At the hospital emergency room, the victim was confronted by the defendant and became hysterical. The
court held that the res gestae exception was applicable since she was still in a state of excitement.
" Bertrang, 50 Wis.2d at 706, 184 N.W.2d at 869.
.. Courts are forced to expand the time intervals since "children may not immediately complain because of
threats, fear, guilt and other pressures to keep the incident 'a secret."' Skoler, supra note 67, at 7 (citing
Bulkley, Child Sexual Abuse And The Law, supra note 72).
"Id. at 8.
x_ When utilizing the residual exceptions, the main concern is whether the hearsay testimony provides
"equivalent circumstancial guarantees of trustworthiness" as compared to the other specifically enumerated
exceptions. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 324.1, at 908 (3d ed. 1984). There has been an ongoing
debtate as to whether the residual exceptions should be used liberally, see e.g., lmwinkelried, The Scope of
the Residual Hearsay Eceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 239 (1978), or
sparingly, see e.g., Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Two Emceptions in
Search of a Rule. 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867 (1982).
"E.g.. Skoler. supra note 67; Note, stqpra note 68.
Skoler, supra note 67, at 8-9.
NOTES
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As pointed out in the above quote, the biggest criticism of using the residual
exceptions in child sexual abuse cases is that child sexual abuse is a unique area of
the law and the residual exceptions simply do not provide enough guidance to the
courts. "Beyond requiring the presence of circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness, the exception, as it exists in Wisconsin [referring to Bertrang], provides no
guidance to the courts in considering the special circumstances of these statements
... These exceptions require more particularized standards of need and trustworthi-
ness. ' 85
Some states, such as Washington,8 6 have enacted statutes which provide for a
specific hearsay exception in child sexual abuse cases. The remainder of this
casenote will compare and contrast the Washington statute to the Sorenson court's
adoption of the residual exception. The Sorenson court's five-part test is comparable
to the Washington statute as it provides the much-needed guidance to the courts.8 7
The Washington Statute
The Washington statute providing for a specific hearsay exception in child
sexual abuse cases reads, in part, as follows:
A statement made by a child when under the age often describing
any act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, not
otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence
in dependency proceedings under Title 13 RCW and criminal proceed-
ings in the courts of the state of Washington if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the
presence of thejury, that the time, content, and circumstances
of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: Provided, That
when the child is unavailable as a witness, such statement
may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the
act.88
' Note, supra note 68, at 1763.
"' WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988).
7 It should be noted that this casenote does not oppose the Washington statute. Indeed, the Supreme Court
of Washington has upheld its constitutionality. State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 691 P.2d 165,691 P.2d 197 (1984).
This casenote only advocates that ifa state has not enacted legislation regarding hearsay exceptions in child
sexual abuse cases, the residual exceptions provide as much guidance as statutes.
" WASH. REv. Cooi- ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988).
[Vol. 22:3
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The Washington statute has been acclaimed for "requir[ing] courts to look for
alternative indicia of reliability if the statement falls outside all of the established
class exceptions," and "therefore ensur[ing] that courts will not be limited to
traditional hearsay analysis," 9 -[T]he Washington exception mitigates the possi-
bility of judicial abuse of discretion and provides detailed guidance to the courts
seeking to apply it."9
Sorenson Test Comparable to Washington Statute
As previously noted, the primary criticism of using the residual exception in
child sexual abuse cases is that it provides little guidance to the courts.9 Although
the Washington statute sets out four factors to consider ("that the time, content, and
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability" and "cor-
roborative evidence of the act"),9 2 the statute itself gives courts little guidance. It
does not explain which time, which content, and which circumstances are important,
and it leaves unanswered which types of corroborative evidence are significant.
In contrast, the Sorenson court's five-factor test is quite explanatory. When
broken down, the test actually consists of sixteen sub-factors. First, the test examines
the attributes of the child (including age, verbal communication skills, comprehen-
sion of statements, knowledge of truth and falsehood, and fear of punishment or other
personal interest which might affect the child's articulation or motivation to tell the
truth).93 Second, the test focuses on the recipient of the child's statement (including
relationship to the child, the relationship's impact on the statement's trustworthi-
ness, and the recipient's motivation to fabricate or distort the statement). 94 Third, the
test explains the circumstances of the statement (including relation to the time of
assault, availability of a confidant, and other contextual factors which might enhance
or detract trustworthiness). 95 Fourth, the test reviews the statement itself (including
any sign of deceit or falsity, and whether the statement contains matters not
ordinarily attributable to a child of similar age). 96 Fifth, the test examines the
consistency of the statement with other corroborative evidence (including physical
evidence of assault, statements made to others, and opportunity or motive of the
defendant). 97
Clearly, the Sorenson test is much more defined and detailed than the
Washington statute. The Washington statute fails to provide for examining the
s' Note, supra note 68, at 1765.
' Id.
9' See supra text accompanying note 85.
12 WASH. RrV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120.
13 Sorenson. 143 Wis. 2d at 245, 421 N.W.2d at 84.
4 Id.
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statement's recipient. It does not elaborate on "circumstances" or "corroborative
evidence". It does not list personal attributes of the child. The only mention of the
child in the Washington statute is the ten-year age limit." The Washington statute
does not make an exception for an eleven-year old with cognitive skills of a seven-
year old or vice versa. With the Sorenson test, the court can take a child's mental age
(which is what the courts are truly concerned with) into consideration rather than just
the chronological age. The Sorenson test also provides guidance to the court in
weighing each factor,9 9 and further requires that the "totality" of the factors insure
that "the statement possesses the requisite 'circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness' required by section 908.045(6), Stats."""
Cases Interpreting the Washington Statute
Reviewing the Washington courts' applications of the Washington statute
further supports the conclusion that the Sorenson test is comparable to the Washing-
ton statute.
1) Indicia of Reliability
Under the Washington statute, the "time, content and circumstances of the
statement [must] provide sufficient indicia of reliability." "" The Washington courts
consider whether the child had a motive to lie. In State v. Frey, '02the court concluded
that there was no evidence suggesting a motive to lie to people "relatively unknown
to her".' Similarly, the Sorenson court concluded there was no evidence that L.S.
fabricated her statements to the social worker who was unknown to her. ' In Frey,
the court also noted that the child's low mental development rendered it "unlikely
[that the child would] fabricate a graphic account of sexual activity because such
activity is beyond the realm of [her] experience." '0 In Sorenson, the court noted that
' WASH. RFv. CODr ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988). The reason for establishing an age limit around ten years is
not that older children are more likely to make false accusations (See supra text accompanying notes 74-76),
but rather -[a]t this age. children are not physically or psychologically sexually developed, nor have they
developed the cognitive facilities of adulthood." Skoler, sqnra note 67, at 45. "ITlhe lack of the child's
cognitive skills increase rather than decreases the inherent reliability of reports of sexual abuse." Id. at 46.
Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 246, 421 N.W.2d at 85.
"' Id. See svqlra text accompanying note 52.
.. WAsH. Riv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988). In Ryan, the Supreme Court of Washington set forth nine
factors for the courts to consider when determining reliability of hearsay testimony under the Washington
statute. 103 Wash. 2d at 175-76, 691 P.2d at 205. To be considered reliable, the hearsay testimony must
substantially meet these nine factors. State v. Griffith, 45 Wash. App. 728,738-39,727 P.2d 247,254 (1986).
..2 43 Wash. App. 605, 718 P.2d 846 (1986).
"Id. at 6l(. 718 P.2d at 849. (Six-year-old girl made statements to the children's director of an emergency
support shelter and a social worker).
'' 143 Wis. 2d at 247, 421 N.W.2d at 85.
' 43 Wash. App. at 610-II. 718 P.2d at 849-50 (quoting Comment, Se toally Abused Injant Hearsay
Eception: A Constitutional Analysis, 8 J. Juv. LAW 59, 67 (1984)).
I Vol. 22:3
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seven-year-old L.S. had the mentality of a four-year-old.,' 6
In Griffith, ""the court found a motive to lie: "Uncle Jimmy would hurt her
father if she did not say he did it.""" Similarly, the first factor of the Sorenson test
requires the courts to determine if there is "any fear of punishment, retribution or
other personal interest, such as close familial relationship with the defendant ...
which might affect the ... motivation to tell the truth."'""19
in State v. Coolev,' "'the court noted that several people had heard the child's
statement -- initially the child's mother and a social worker, and later a detective,
defense counsel, and a deputy prosecutor.' Similarly, in Sorenson, the social
worker, physician, and psychiatrist all testified that L.S. made the same state-
ments.' 12
In State v. Henderson," 3 the court interpreted "spontaneity" to include state-
ments "volunteered" in response to questions.' 4 The Henderson court noted that
the detective, like other professionals, was "trained to be objective" in investigating
child sexual abuse cases.I I' The detective had never met the child before investigat-
ing the case and was therefore not personally attached to the child." 6
Once again, the Sorenson decision is in accord." 7 The court noted the social
worker's experience with child sexual abuse cases" 8 and that she had no motive to
fabricate the statements." 9
The Cooley court concluded that the content of the child's statements showed
that the child distinguished between the defendant and his brother, 21 thereby
143 Wis. 2d at 246, 421 N.W.2d at 85.
"7 45 Wash. App. 728, 727 P.2d 247.
"s Id. at 739, 727 P.2d at 254.
"' 143 Wis. 2d at 245, 421 N.W.2d at 84.
""48 Wash. App. 286, 738 P.2d 705, review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1002 (1987) (A five-year-old boy stated
that the defendant made him engage in oral sex).
I IId. at 294, 738 P.2d at 709; See also, Robinson, 44 Wash. App. at 620, 722 P.2d at 1385 ("Remarkably
similar statements were given to four different people on four separate occasions").
1_2 143 Wig. 2d at 235-38, 421 N.W.2d at 80-82. See also, supra note 22.
"'48 Wash. App. 543, 740 P.2d 329, review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1008 (1987).
"' Id. at 550, 740 P.2d at 333. In Henderson, the detective asked the seven-year-old child why her vagina
hurt when her father touched her vagina. The child voluntarily told the detective that her father stuck his
fingers in her vagina. "His question was neither leading nor suggestive. Thus, the statement qualifies as
,spontaneous'." Id.
"I Id. at 551, 740 P.2d at 334.
"Id. at 550-51, 740 P.2d at 333-34.
"7 143 Wis. 2d at 247, 421 N.W.2d at 85.
UX Id.
"9 Id. at 247-48, 421 N.W.2d at 85.
"48 Wash. App. at 295, 738 P.2d at 709. See also. supra note 110. The child used "two dolls of different
sizes to demonstrate the difference in size between the boys' [the defendant and his brother] genitalia." 48
Wash. App. at 289, 738 P.2d at 707.
13
Renis: The Adequacy of the Residual Exceptions in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1989
AKRON LAW REVIEW
"making the possibility of his faulty recollection remote." 2 Similarly, the Sorenson
court noted that L.S. had consistently distinguished between her father's acts in the
bathroom and her uncle's acts on the living room couch. 22
In State v. Jackson,'' 3 the court held that a nine-year-old girl's statements,
made approximately one month after the assault, were admissible. 24 In Sorenson,
the court permitted the hearsay testimony even though the social worker did not
interview L.S. until approximately four to seven days after the last act of sexual
assault. 25
In summation, the Sorenson court looked to the same principles in determin-
ing the "reliability" of hearsay that the Washington courts have applied, and did so
by utilizing the residual exception.
2) Other Corroborating Evidence
Both the Washington statute and the Sorenson test require the court to consider
other corroborating evidence. In Hunt, 26 the court held that 'corroborative
evidence of the act' requires that there be 'evidence of sufficient circumstances
which would support a logical and reasonable inference' that the act of abuse
described in the hearsay statement occurred." 27
In State v. Gitchel, '28 the court found that the following evidence corroborated
the charges of sexual abuse: "[The doctor's] finding of partial vaginal penetration
and [the child's] inappropriate behavior during the doctor's examination,' 129 and
"testimony about [the child's] nightmares." 13 0
In State v. Justiniano,' 3 a four-year-old girl's ten-year-old brother testified to
seeing the defendant's hand in the girl's pants during Christmas vacation. 3 2 The
court held: "Clearly, the brother's testimony corroborated [the girl's] hearsay
statement to her mother." 3 3
21 Id. at 295, 738 P.2d at 709.
122 143 Wis. 2d at 249, 421 N.W.2d at 86.
" 42 Wash. App. 393, 711 P.2d 1086 (1985).
124 Id. at 397, 711 P.2d at 1088-89.
2S 143 Wis. 2d at 237, 421 N.W.2d at 81.
12' 48 Wash. App. 840, 741 P.2d 566.
.
72 Id. at 849,741 P.2d at 571-721 (citing Bremerton v. Corbett, 106 Wash. 2d 569,578,723 P.2d 1135, 1140
(1986)).
2 41 Wash. App. 820, 706 P.2d 1091, review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1003 (1985). See also, John Doe. 105
Wash. 2d at 897, 719 P.2d at 558 (Utter, J., concurring) (corroborative evidence includes "confessions and
expert testimony on whether victim's behavior is typical of children who have been sexually abused").
"29 41 Wash. App. at 828, 706 P.2d at 1096.
130 Id.
"' 48 Wash. App. 572, 740 P.2d 872 (1987).
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In Robinson, 134 the defendant sexually abused a three-year-old girl after
making her lie on her stomach on a blanket. Although the physical examination of
the girl showed "no evidence of penetration or physical injury," '35the court held
that the semen stain found on the blanket was sufficient corroborating evidence even
though the stain could not be phenotyped.136
In applying the corroborative evidence requirement, the Sorenson court noted
the physical evidence of multiple assaults, Ronald Sorenson's opportunity to be
alone with L.S., and the consistency of the evidence with L.S.'s statements. ,31 Thus,
a review of Washington decisions reveals that both the Sorenson court and the
Washington statute apply the corroborative evidence requirement in the same
manner.
CONCLUSION
Child sexual abuse is an ever-increasing problem in our society. These cases
are difficult to prosecute because the perpetrator and the child are usually the only
witnesses to the crime. 13' Recognizing the seriousness of the problem, the Sorenson
court set forth a detailed, five-part test for use in determining the admissibility of
hearsay testimony in child sexual abuse cases. 13 1
The primary criticism of utilizing the residual exceptions in child sexual abuse
cases is that these exceptions provide little guidance to the courts."" However, the
Sorenson test, used in conjunction with the residual exceptions, gives courts as much
guidance in child sexual abuse cases as statutes providing for a specific hearsay
exception. In addition, the Sorenson court's application of the test is in accord with
the Washington courts' application of the Washington statute.
If a state legislature has not created a specific hearsay exception for child
sexual abuse cases, use of the residual exception, coupled with Sorenson's five-part
test, is the most appropriate and reliable approach a court can take.
ROBERT G. REMIS
3444 Wash. App. 611, 722 P.2d 1379.
135 Id. at 614, 722 P.2d at 1382.
'llId. at 621, 722 P.2d at 1385.
31 143 Wis. 2d at 250, 421 N.W.2d at 86.
3 Skoler, supra note 67 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 68 and accompanying text.
"3 143 Wis.2d at 245-46, 421 N.W.2d at 84-85.
"' Note, supra note 68 at 1763. See supra text accompanying note 85.
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